4 Of the 14 post WWII elections four have gone against the opinion poll leader, two in each direction. 2 whenever 'the time is right'. Although extant research into endogenous election timing is scarce, most studies have focused on the idea of 'political surfing' (Cargill and Hutchison 1991; Chowdhury 1993; Gallego 1998a,b; Inoguchi 1979 Inoguchi , 1981 Ito 1990a , 1990b , Ito and Parks 1988 Palmer and Whiten 1995; Reid 1998; Saito 1999) . In this view, leaders simply wait until conditions are advantageous and then go to the polls. Indeed, of the studies above, only Cargill and Hutchinson's (1991) analysis of Japan and Reid's (1998) study of Canada finds any evidence that politicians actively manipulate policy instruments in preparation for an up coming election.
These studies assume the electoral outcome is simply an expression of relative support for the government at the time the election is called. As such, a party's vote share simply reflects the government's performance during its time in office. There is no conception that the timing of an election influences the outcome beyond it being chosen when the government looks at its best.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the timing decision itself influences the electoral result and that early elections are more than a simple conversion of popular support into vote share. The basis of my argument is informational. I assume leaders have better information about likely future performance than the electorate. In the theory I propose, the date of the election signals a leader's expectations about the future. Unfortunately for leaders, in using their information advantage in determining the attractiveness an immediate elections, they tip their
hand as to what the information is. This signaling mechanism provides a link between the date of elections, electoral outcomes and future performance. Since I provide a formal model elsewhere (Smith 1996) , here I use accounts of British political events as a vehicle to explain the theory.
Following the successful conclusion of the Falklands war in 1982 the British
Conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was extremely popular. Given that she was elected in 1979, she did not need to call an election before
1984. Yet her enormous popularity following the war, might have made for an excellent opportunity to secure another five year term. Indeed speculation about the possibility of an early election was sufficiently intense that polling organizations took polls of the desirability and likelihood of an early election (see for example, Index of International Public Opinion 1982-83, p. 353) . Suppose, consistent with the 'surfing' hypothesis, her popularity would ensure her victory if she called an election in 1982. By waiting, she risked having her popularity undermined by policy failures. However, the extent to which she feared this, depended upon how well she expected to perform over the coming year. If she believed she had effective solutions to problems and if she believed that her party had both the appropriate policies and was competent to 4 implement these policies then waiting posed little threat as she could expect to get reelected in the future anyway. Yet, if she were less confident about her polices or her ability to effectively implement them then waiting jeopardized a second term in office, since policy failure would likely undermine her support. In short, the more confidence she was about the future, the smaller her incentive to call an early election; the less confident she was, the greater the incentive to cash-in on past successes with a snap election.
The timing of elections reveals information about how well incumbents expect to perform in the future. The less confident Margaret Thatcher was in her ability to rule well, the greater her incentive to call an early election when she was ahead in the polls. Competent governments wait longer before calling elections. Unfortunately, the above analytic narrative presents only half the picture. The initial supposition was that she would have been reelected if she had called an election immediately following the war. However, it is incompetent, not competent, leaders that want to take advantage of this opportunity. What then is the inference that the voters should draw upon seeing an early election? They should infer that the incumbent doubts her ability to continue producing good outcomes in the future. Leaders that call early elections should expect to see their support decline. This is exactly what happened to Wilson in 1970 and to Chirac in 1997 . The early election is a signal leaders do not expect conditions to be as rosy in the future. In anticipation of this upcoming decline, the electorate reevaluate their assessment of the government's success.
If early elections, being a signal of incompetence, lead to a decline in support, why do leaders ever call early elections? It is worth returning to Thatcher's first term in office to consider this question. Although she resisted the temptation of an election in 1982, she did not wait until 9 th May 1984, the last possible moment, but rather on 9 th May 1983 announced elections for June 9 th 1983. In their autobiographies, both she and her future chancellor, Nigel
Lawson, mention fears of increasing inflation. "It was pointed out that the main economic indicators would look slightly better then than in the autumn because inflation was due to rise 5 Approval of the government's record and satisfaction with Thatcher dropped much more modestly by 1% and 2% respectively over the same period. A MORI poll for the same time period gave the Conservatives a 46% vote share. 5 slightly in the second half of the year (Thatcher 1993, p288 . See also Lawson 1992. p246)."
By calling the election in June 1983, they prevented the electorate from observing this worsening of inflation, which presumably would have resulted in a decline in popularity for the Tories. However, if as I propose, the signal of an early election reveals that the future will not be so rosy, then the very act of calling an election reveals the information that the government was trying to conceal. This is borne out in public opinion data. In May 1983, prior to the election announcement, Gallup reported a voting intention of 49% for the Conservatives. Yet, in June's general election they receive only 42.2% of the vote.
5 While the margin of error in the opinion data probably account for some of this difference, it is clear that elections are more than a direct translation of popularity into vote share. The objective of politicians is not to maximize vote
share, but to remain in power. Despite their decline in popularity, the Conservatives won 397 of 650 seats. In contrast the opposition was split between the traditional opposition Labour party which obtained 209 seats with a vote share 27.6 and an alliance between the Liberals and Social
Democrats which together obtained 23 seats from a vote share of 25.4%. The Conservative victory, the largest since 1945, was not a result of overwhelming popularity for the Tories, but was instead the result of fighting a divided and demoralized opposition. As Nigel Lawson put it "Labour was in such a mess with an unelectable leader, left wing policies which the country would never stomach, and suffering badly from the Social Democrats defection.... (1992. p. 246) ." In fact Lawson goes on to state that at the time he thought Labour was in such a poor position that the Conservative could have won anytime. However, also admits, that with hindsight, a "bird in the hand" is powerful argument for an election.
Given the first-past-the-post, plurality electoral system in Britain, with such large divisions the opposition had little hope of unseating the Tories (Duverger 1963; Lijphart 6 By convention British elections occur on a Thursday, the most recent exception being Tuesday October 27 th 1931 . 6 1994 Rae 1967; Riker 1982 An inherent feature of the theory is that leaders enjoy office holding. Factors that effect the value of office affect the decision to call elections. This can manifest itself in several ways. In the 1950 general election, against expectations, Clement Atlee's Labour government managed to retain power although with a much reduced majority of only six (Butler 1952 The technical difference between the two conceptualizations of the government's informational advantage is that in the competence formulation leaders know the stochastic process that generates future performance, but they do not yet know the value of the random variable generated by this process. In contrast in the foreknowledge formulation the leader is assumed to know precisely the random variable generated by the process. In both conceptualizations, the voters use past performance and the timing of elections to estimate the properties of the underlying stochastic process-the ability of the government.
The foreknowledge conceptualization provides a link to another branch of political economy: political business cycles (Chappell and Peel 1979; Lacher 1982; Nordhaus1975; Reid 1998; Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Tufte 1978) . In this literature, leaders manipulate policy instruments to generate favorable economic conditions under which to hold elections. In this context one reason currently successful leaders anticipate a decline in performance is because they engineered their current success in the first place.
In systems with fixed electoral terms the incumbent can not choose elections when 11 conditions are rosy. Instead, the political business cycles literature suggests leaders manipulate policy instruments such that their performance looks good at the time of the election, even if such manipulations lead to lower aggregate performance in the long run. Suppose that leaders in parliamentary systems can manipulate policy instruments to manufacture short term booms at the expense of long run performance. In terms of the modeling strategy I propose, such policy manipulations should be interpreted as information that the incumbent has about future performance. As discussed above, incumbents with strong current performance, but with low expectations about the future, have an incentive to call early elections. Thus, an electorate that sees an early election called during a string of government successes, particularly a short term string of successes, should be wary of crediting the government. The fact that the government wants an election suggests that the future is not as rosy and that the boom might be a product of myopic government manipulation rather than underlying successful policies.
Rational expectations proponents doubt the ability of governments to produce real changes in the economy. For example, they propose that if economic actors see prices rise at the end of the electoral term then they infer that it is not the result of real economic expansion but rather of the government's attempt to increase demand. However, in the endogenous election timing framework economic actors do not always know when the election is coming and so there is more ambiguity as to how they should interpret 'boom'. This perhaps suggests that parliamentary leaders have more flexibility to engineer an economic expansion than fixed term Presidential leaders, since everyone knows the latter has incentives to do so. Although suggestive of a difference in the ability of leaders to create an artificial boom, the theory proposed here suggests leaders from both systems face the same difficulty in capitalizing from such manipulation. In the fixed term system 'rational expectations' actors know the government wants to stimulate the economy and so ignore economic signals. In the endogenous election system, at least for early elections, economic actors, not certain that an election is coming, respond more positively to manipulation creating a boom. However, although the boom creates 9 Even though it is difficult for politicians to benefit from engineered booms, this does not mean they have no incentive to carry them out. As Rogoff (1990) points out, if voters are already going to discount your performance, believing you manipulated conditions, then if you fail to manipulate conditions, once discounted your performance looks even worse. Alternatively expressed, rather than manipulation helping, failing to do so hinders. 12 good short run economic results, it harms long run expected performance. Unfortunately for the government, it can not cash in on its engineered boom, since doing so signals that the boom is itself a short term phenomenon and leaner economic times are to follow. 9 Clearly, the relationship between the manipulation of policy instruments and the timing of elections needs greater consideration than space allows here. The informational theory I propose unifies the concepts of 'surfing' and 'manipulation' that the literature sees as distinct. The theory predicts early elections are triggered when the government anticipates an economic decline. It does not matter whether these expectations arise passively (surfing) or as the result of prior attempts by the government to actively engineer a boom (manipulation). Fortunately, with respect to testing the arguments here, the source of future performance does not matter. The only relevant consideration is that governments have more accurate expectations about the future than the citizens.
Testing the timing of election and its electoral and economic consequences.
The informational theory above proposes prime minsters use their informational advantage over the electorate in determining when to call elections. However, precisely because the timing decision is based on the leader's private information, early elections provide a signal of the governments private information. If leaders call early elections when they anticipate future decline in performance, then following an early election performance should indeed decline. If the voters utilize the information revealed via the timing decision then the incumbent's support should also be influenced by the timing of elections.
The theory proposes a link between three types of data: timing, performance and electoral 10 The timing data were obtained primarily from Butler and Butler's (1994 ) British Political Facts 1900 -1994 . This source provided the session of parliaments, change in prime minister, by elections results, change of allegiance, election results and public opinion data. These data were supplimented by the Nuffield College series, The British General Election of 19XX. This series provides detailed accounts of the run up to each election from 1945 until the most recent election in1997. In particular, I used this series to code the announcement date for each election. Keesing's Record of World Events provided the missing data on the opening of parliament in 1997.
11 Gallup public opinion data are compiled for the years prior to 1994 in Butler and Butler 1994 . They include voting intentions, approval of government record, approval of prime minister and opposition leader and which party is thought most likely to win the next election. For the post 1994 period, I supplemented these data using MORI (Market & Opinion Research International Ltd.) data.
12 I obtained Economic data on GDP, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates from International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC). The unemployment data was complied was a variety of sources. Unfortunately, I could not obtain consistent monthly data over the whole period. From Jan 1945 to June 1964 I used the ILO monthly data. This series becomes only yearly at this point. From Jan 1975 I used OECD's quarterly Labour Force Statistics. These data are quarterly from Oct 1975 onwards and monthly from Dec. 1980 onwards. All additional economic data are from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) data, which are available through the University of Essex data archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/). 13 I modified the seat share according to bye election results. These data are from Butler and Butler (1994) to occur as the result of the death or incapacitation of an MP. Unfortunately, I do not have information as to when the seat became vacant, so I code the change as occurring on the day of the by election. Although these differences are small, we should bear in mind that the presence of Alfred Broughton, who remained home sick, would have prevented labour's defeat in the 1979 no confidence vote (March 28 th 1979) . See Baron (1998 ), Huber (1996 and Lupia and Strom (1995) for discussions of election timing and coalition dynamics. I also coded for change in allegiance using data from Butler and Butler (1994) . Unfortunately, I have found no reliable sources to code these data beyond 1994. I included in the change of allegiance data MPs who had the whip removed. These data are typically only coded to the nearest month. In these circumstances, I took the shift of allegiance (and any reinstatement) to occur on the first on the month. Again with the exception of the simultaneous (and temporary) defection of 24 Labour MP in 1968 these changes are small in magnitude.
14 I could extend my analysis back to the beginning of the century, which provides 11 additional parliaments. Unfortunately, it is unclear that this really increases the degrees of freedom to work with. Firstly, there are data restriction. Public opinion is practically unheard of until after 1945. Economic data is also less prevalent. Second, the maximum length of parliament is seven years prior to 1911, and two parliaments ignored the statuary limit during wars. Third, there is extreme volatility in the two party system with the Labour party displacing the Liberals. The 'Irish' question also produces a realignment of the parties. These factors combined to make 14
An Econometric Model of the Timing of elections.
In assessing what factors influence the timing of elections the relevant dependent variable is the length of time that each parliament lasts. Our objective is to estimate the probability of an election being called on each day. It is worthwhile specifying the precise structure of the data.
Each parliament starts with its first sitting, which is time zero. The parliament continues until either the prime minister goes to the monarch and asks for permission to dissolve parliament and hold new elections, or five years have expired, in which case presumably the monarch automatically dissolves parliament. Statistically, analyzing such data falls under the domain of duration analysis, often also called hazard analysis. The objective is to estimate the probability that the parliament ends on each particular day conditional on it not have previously terminated, the hazard rate (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980, Greene 1993, chapter 22 14 The events I am interested in are the days on which the prime minster announces coalition and national governments prevalent. Given the additional control variables and ambiguity of coding decision for this period, it is unclear that adding these 11 additional parliaments really increases the available information.
15 Since Tony Blair, the current British prime minister, has yet to call an election, we do not know when the current parliament will terminate. This lack of information is referred to as censoring. All we know is that up until today an election has not been called. The issue of censoring is particularly relevant for the parliament that terminated in 1979. On March 28 th 1979 the Labour government lost a no confidence motion by a single vote. This de facto meant James Callaghan, the prime minister, was forced on the following day to ask the queen to dissolve parliament. For the analysis presented I code the 1979 announcement as censored by the previous day's lost confidence vote, however coding March 29 th as a failure event makes little difference in the analysis.
16 I used STATA (version 6) throughout.
15
elections. In hazard analysis this is referred to as the failure event. 15 The objective of the analysis is to determine the extent to which various factors influence the hazard rate at which elections are called.
Hazard analysis presents an interesting problem in terms of model specification. In addition to the usual problem of which independent variables to include there is the additional complication of specifying the function form of the hazard. Hence a variety of estimators have arisen, some non-parametric, some parametric and some which specify the functional form only up to some unknown underlying hazard rate. This later class is typically referred to as semi- 18 See Therneau et.al., 1990; Cox and Snell 1968; Flemming and Harrington, 1991. 19 AIC=-2(loglikelihood)+2(c+p+1), where c is the number of model covariates and p is the number of ancillary parameters to be estimated. The preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC. is robust with regard to the precise specification of the model, I present only the results from the wiebull parameterization. In this specification, time affects the hazard rate, the probability of calling an election conditional on not having previously called one, in two ways: first, directly through the inclusion of the years to go and (years to go) 2 squared variables in the vector of covariates, and second, through the ancillary parameter p which indicates how the hazard rate varies over time. Specifically, the hazard rate for a weibull model is h(t)=p(t) (p-1) , where =e X , X being the vector of covariates. The inherent non-linearity in this specification make direct interpretation of the coefficients difficult. However, Figures 1 and 2 graphically show the predicted hazard rates. Figure 1 compares the predictions for model 7 across all parliaments, while Figure 2 compares the hazard rates predicted by models 7 and 8 for two parliaments. As we 20 Majority size was the only variable that ever violated tests of the proportionality assumption in the Cox proportionate hazard model. The null hypothesis was only rejected in a few model specifications and then only in some, and not all, of the tests.
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would suspect the hazard rises rapidly as the end of the term approaches.
As predicted government popularity and majority size influence election timing decisions.
As all the models in Table 2 indicate, popular rather than unpopular governments are more likely to call elections and governments without firm majorities are more likely to go to the nation early 20 . Both the public opinion and majority variables are in the form of two party comparisons (Labour and Conservative). Multiparty variants of these variables give similar, if slightly weaker, results. When used alone, alternative measures of public opinion such as comparisons of Prime ministers' and opposition leaders' approval, and approval of government and opposition parties also support the conclusion that it is popular government that call elections. However, in the presence voting intentions data these variables tend to wash out; Prime ministers' decisions are driven more by likely electoral consequences than by the popularity of themselves or their party.
Model 2 ( assesses the effect of changes in economic conditions. Neither changes in the growth nor unemployment level over the previous six month have a significant effect, a result that holds for a wide variety of lags. However, elections appear to be preceded by periods of increased inflation. As model 4 shows a 1% increase in the inflation rate relative to six months earlier makes elections approximately 1.6 times more likely than if inflation had remained constant.
Foreknowledge: the role of future economic performance in triggering elections.
Theoretically, I assume an informational asymmetry: governments have better expectations of future performance than the electorate. Given this assumption the government can base its decision to go to the country not just on current conditions, but also on economic data in the future. Table 3 presents weibull hazard analyses including covariates reflecting the economic change that will occur after the election. For example, the variable Growth next half year is the rate of growth 183 days into the future minus the rate of growth now (More generally for any variable X the quarterly change in the future is X t =X t+91 -X t , and a half year change is X t =X t+183 -X t ). While contemporary economic data has little effect, these future changes show a statistically significant effect in altering the probability of an election. In particular, a decline in 21 The growth rate reported is from the ONS series ABMI, (annualized growth rate in GDP measured at constant prices and seasonally adjusted.). Other measure of GDP taken from the IMF given the same results. However, in nominal prices (ONS series YBEU) the coefficient is reversed unless inflation is controlled for. Consistent with predictions, models 5, 6 and 7 (Table 3) show future economic decline makes elections more likely. In particular, decline in the future growth rate or an increase in the future inflation or unemployment rate triggers early elections. Before discussing the substantive implications, I discuss the robustness and general trends in these findings. I checked the 22 The interests rate (treasury bill, deposit rate, government short and long term bond rates) and exchange rate (US$\sterling) are from the IMF. The balance of payments (KTNC, and HBOP) and consumptive expenditure (NMRY) are from ONS. 20 explanatory power of other leads, quarterly, half yearly and yearly (91, 183 and 365 days, respectively). I also examined the effects of future economic change in each variable in isolation, in pairs and in conjunction with other combinations of variables. Since it is impractical to report all these analyses, Table 3 reports models chosen on the basis of AIC. Rather than regurgitate the significance levels reported in table 3, I summarize robustness in terms of these wider analyses (available upon request). Overall these results are robust. However, changes in the growth rate have the weakest effect, not appearing significant in all specifications. The strongest result is for inflation. The effect of the variables also differs temporally. The inflation effect is most significant over short time spans, while unemployment is important over the longer run. The effect of future unemployment appears particularly strongly when other variables are excluded.
In addition to the variables reported, I examined the effect of various other economic and policy variables and their change, both past and future. These included, interest rates, exchange rates, balance of payments, and government consumption expenditure. 22 While some of these variables produced consistent patterns, they did not reject the null hypothesis (coefficient of zero) in sufficient specifications to warrant inclusion.
The results in Table 3 support the prediction that when a leader anticipates a downturn in performance it triggers elections. Yet, this result can not distinguish the nature of the informational asymmetry. The political business cycle literature suggests knowledge of impending decline exists because of the government's own manipulation of policy instruments.
The strength of future inflation coupled with an increase in inflation prior to elections might cause us to suspect manipulation since it is easier to manufacture boom in the nominal rather than real terms. On the other hand, policy instruments such as exchange and interest rates can not be systematically linked to election timing. From the theoretical perspective advanced here, all that matters is an informational advantage for the government, whether it is a manifestation of surfing' or manipulation is irrelevant. This might help explain the lack on concrete evidence one way or the other for political business cycles (Alesina and Roubini. 1992; Balke 1991; Carlsen 1999; Clark et. al 1998. Heckelman and Berument 1998; Schultz 1995) .
Electoral support and the timing of elections. relative to expectations signal a decline in future performance, and hence it is in these cases that we expect the greatest decline in the government's support. The greatest problem with testing this hypothesis is that it is not simply the timing of elections per se but rather how this timing compares to expectations. Unfortunately, I do not have systematic data on peoples' 23 I am in the process of using counting stories relating to electoral speculation in The Times from 1945 as an alternative measure of expectations. 24 If, for example, the Conservatives were in power then Chg. in two party support =100%* (con_vote/(con_vote+lab_vote))-(vi_con/(vi_con+vi_lab)), where con_vote is the Conservatives %age vote share and vi_con is the pre-announcement %age voting intentions for the Conservatives. be large, the figure shows that it is not earliness of elections per se that effects support but rather it is the earliness of elections relative to expectations. Figure 4 graphs the change in government support against the difference in predicted hazard rates between the informed and uniformed models (7 and 8, respectively). The pattern is clear. When the likelihood of an election is much higher in the informed model than the uninformed model, when the economy is about to decline, the incumbent's support declines when elections are announced. The electorate uses the signal of an unanticipated election to make inferences about future economic performance and reassesses the government's performance in light of this information.
Next I present a series of OLS regressions to explain the 2 party change in support for the government following the announcement of an election (Table 4) . I use the 2 party version of the variable for consistency with 2 party comparisons in earlier tables. In the multiparty version of 25 I use Bayes rule to put some analytical rigor behind this assertion. Suppose the government's performance can be classified as either good or bad in each period, and the probability of success depends upon the ability of the government. As an example, let the 23 change in support the results are slightly stronger than those reported here. I create a series of measures to assess the earliness of elections relative to expectations. Model 9 is an OLS regression of the difference between the predicted hazard rate in the informed (7) and the uninformed (8) models, i.e the best fit line in Figure 4 . The spirit of the analysis is to ask how unexpected was the election given known factors relative to the likelihood of an election given foreknowledge of future economic performance. Heuristically, this can be thought of as using the residuals from a regression to assess the extent of unknown factors. While standard OLS type residuals do not exist, a variety of generalized residuals have been suggested for hazard models.
They can be interpretated as the number of failures relative to the expected number of failures (Therneau et. al. 1990 ; see STATA manual version 6 Vol. 3 p. 453 for computational techniques).
As such these residuals provide a measure of earliness relative to expectations. The difference between the Martingale residuals (model 10) show that it is earliness relative to expectation rather than actual earliness that accounts for changes in electoral supports. Similar results occur for other residual specifications. months, often by double digits. Although the signal of an election might still reveal a decline over the coming quarters, the government had a long string of successes to weigh against this.
probability of a good outcome be 70% for a competent government, but only 30% for an incompetent one. Assuming that an election announcement signals a bad outcome in the next period, I calculate the electorate's belief about the competence of the government depends upon the number of successful periods prior to the election. Suppose initially the government has a 50% probability of being competent. Having seen a single good outcome, the voters should revise their assessment of government competence to 70%. Yet, given that an early election implies the next outcome is bad, the voters should upon the announcement of the election revise their assessment back to 50%. After three successes, the voters put government competence at 92.7%, which is revised down to 84.5% upon seeing an election. This decline is only 8.2% compared with 20% when the election comes after only a single success. Although illustrative, this example is not an equilibrium analysis. See Smith (1996) for a properly specified model.
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Her support remained buoyant. Unfortunately, for Wilson his success had been much more ephemeral and without long term evidence to refute it, the electorate put Wilson's early 1970's successes down to luck, or engineering, rather than competence. This suggests that the electorate should punish the government for cashing in on short term successes and reward them for resisting such temptations.
I construct measures of the short term incentives to call an election by summing the predicted hazard rate over the 30 days period prior to an election announcement. I label this variable the monthly cumulative hazard. Large values for this variable indicate voting intention, the size of the government's majority and the length of time left, all combine to make an election likely. To assess the extent to which the government has resisted the temptation to call an early election, I calculate the half year cumulative hazard: the predicted hazard rate summed over the 183 days prior to an election announcement. If the government had long term popularity then this later variable takes a large value. Models 11 and 12 (Table 4) observations, that voters punish leaders for trying to cash in on short term success. Models 12 and 13 also help unpack which of the factors that motivate leaders to call elections cause voters to reward or to punish leaders. The actual physical length of time remaining in a parliament appears to have little significant impact on leader support. Similarly, the presence of a new leader appears to have little effect, however, since there is only one leadership change in the data, this variable is more appropriately seen as a 1955 specific dummy. Voters appear to rewards governments with only small majorities that are seeking reelection, perhaps seeing such governments having legitimate needs to go to the nation.
The factor that appears to do most systematic harm to a leader's support is preannouncement popularity. The more popular a leader is at the time of calling an election, the greater her support is likely to decline. The straightforward interpretation of this result is, consistent with predictions, voters punish governments attempting to cash in on short term success. However model 13 suggests this straightforward interpretation is incomplete. As time runs out leaders become increasingly likely to call elections. Given this increase in the likelihood of elections, calling an election provides a much weaker signal of declining future performance.
Voters regard popular leaders going to the polls late in their term as much less opportunistic than those trying to cash in on their popularity earlier. Therefore, the extend to which leaders' popularity prior to announcement declines is moderated by the amount of time remaining in the term. Model 13 contains terms for the interaction of voting intentions with the log of time remaining. Consistent with predictions it is not popularity itself that results in a decline in government support, but rather leaders trying to cash in on their popularity with an opportunistic early election.
Unfortunately this effect is compounded by a measurement problem in using public 26 The dependent variable is vote share minus voting intentions. The earlier hazard analysis shows that high voting intentions make elections likely. Yet, voting intentions only give a gauge of underlying support, they are not definitive measures. Since it is high popularity that triggers elections, we might suspect that voting intentions just prior to an election announcement, on average, overstate the true underlying support for the government. As such, 'simple regression to the mean' suggests declines in electoral support. If voting intentions always had the same effect on the timing decision then this would be of little consequence since the regression to the mean effect would, on average, be constant and as such appear in the intercept. Regrettably this assumption is not valid. As an example, John Major in both 1992 and 1997 effectively ran out the clock, calling elections at the last moment. By the end of the term he had no room to manoeuver and accepted conditions are they were. When Major announced elections there is little reason to assume there is positive measurement error in his underlying support as expressed by voting intentions. Yet, thinking of leaders as needing a high threshold to opportunistically call an early election suggests such a bias exists for early elections. 26 opinion assessments of support. 26 Since leaders are most likely to call elections when extremely popular, expressions of their popularity at announcements are likely to be biased upwards, meaning their electoral support is likely to decline to its true underlying level. As advanced in note 26, this upwards bias is greatest in early elections. Given this problem, the support model 13 provides needs to be regarded with moderation. However, overall the results shown in Table 4 are supportive of hypothesis that the voters use early elections as a signal of the government's private information and moderate their support accordingly.
Conclusion
I present an informational theory of endogenous election timing in which leaders have private information about likely future outcomes. When leaders anticipate a less rosy future they are tempted to call an early election to censor the voters' opportunity to observe this decline. The analyses shown in Table 3 The dependent variable, the 2 party change in government support, is the difference between the government's vote share at the election and voting intentions for the government at the time of announcement compared to comparable figures for the opposition party. If, for example, the Conservatives were in power then two party change in government support equals 100%* (con_vote/(con_vote+lab_vote))-(vi_con/(vi_con+vi_lab)), where con_vote is the Conservatives %age vote share and vi_con is the pre-announcement %age voting intentions for the Conservatives. All independent variables calculated for the day of the election announcement. OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
Variables
Model 9 
